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Abstract 
This paper aims to determine whether and, if so, how the existence of a means-tested, asset-based social insurance 
program and the potential reform thereof impacts wealth distribution in the United States. A dynamic equilibrium 
model that could generate several features of the current state of wealth distribution in the United States was 
developed to investigate to the extent to which social insurance programs affect wealth distribution in the United 
States. The results of several experiments and robustness tests performed using this model suggest that entirely 
eliminating the U.S. social insurance system would decrease the Gini coefficient from its current value of 
approximately 0.8 to less than 0.6. However, the results also indicate that reforming the social insurance system, 
whether by expanding or contracting it by 20%, would have no significant impact on wealth distribution.
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     1 Introduction
Social insurance programs are designed to ensure social fairness and provide a safety
net for poor or disadvantaged individuals. By offering cash transfers and/or subsidies to
individuals falling below a certain income or poverty threshold, these programs have a
redistribution effect within an economy. However, these programs may impact wealth
distribution in a negative rather than a positive manner. As has been discussed in the
literature, when individuals, especially lower-income individuals, believe that they can
rely on the beneﬁts received by social insurance programs, they are encouraged to en-
gage in fewer precautionary saving behaviors. In such a manner, the availability of
social insurance programs may impact household saving in a negative manner. In addi-
tion, the means tests required and asset restrictions imposed by some social programs
further discourage savings, especially to those close to the poverty threshold.1
Indeed, in an examination of social insurance programs, Hubbard et al. (1995) in-
dicated that the asset-based, means-tested nature of the U.S. social insurance system
discourages many Americans from accumulating wealth. Jeske and Kitao (2009) also
incorporated a similar framework of social insurance in a Bewley-type model such that
the model could generate the nature of asset holdings among individuals represented at
the bottom of the wealth distribution, who do not accumulated assets. As wealth dis-
tribution has not been the focus of previous research into social insurance programs,
two important factors remain poorly understood: 1) the extent to which a means-tested,
asset-based social insurance system affects wealth distribution and 2) the impact of re-
forming (e.g., expanding or contracting) a social insurance system on wealth distribu-
tion.
To study the quantitative impact of a social insurance system on wealth distribution,
this study employs a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model characterized by in-
complete markets and heterogeneous agents (i.e., a Bewley-type model). Recognizing
that the basic dynastic Bewley models display a signiﬁcantly lower level of wealth con-
centration than do the relevant U.S. data,2 this study introduces two factors to improve
the model’s performance. First, it attributes the thick left tail of the wealth distribution
to the fact that the means-testing and asset-based nature of the social insurance system
1Several U.S. social programs require means testing and impose asset restrictions, such as Aid to Fami-
lies with Dependent Children (AFDC), Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and the food stamp
program.
2In their classic works, Bewley (1986), Imrohoroglu (1989), Huggett (1993), and Aiyagari (1994) pio-
neered the literature regarding this type of model. Almost all the current general equilibrium, quantitative
models of wealth inequality are versions of Bewley models. See the discussion in Quadrini and Rios-Rull
(1997) and Cagetti and De Nardi (2005).discourages savings among households at the bottom of the wealth distribution. Sec-
ond, to match the long right tail of the wealth distribution, it adopts Krusell and Smith
(1998)’s explanation, which allows for slight heterogeneity regarding utility discount
factors (e.g., time preference).3
To investigate the impact of social insurance programs as well as the potential im-
pact of policy changes thereof on wealth distribution, this study adopted the strategy of
(1) developing a model of a social insurance system that can generate a level of wealth
distribution consistent with that of the current U.S. level and then (2) performing coun-
terfactualexperimentstoinvestigatedifferencesinwealthdistributionamongeconomies
that differ in terms of the size of their social insurance system.4
The experiment results suggest that entirely eliminating the means-tested, asset-
based social insurance system would increase the share of wealth among the bottom
40% of households from less than 1% to 9% and decrease the Gini coefﬁcient from .80
to .56. It would do so by prompting these households to increase their level of pre-
cautionary savings in recognition that they could no longer rely on the distribution of
social insurance beneﬁts to meet their basic needs. However, the results also indicate
that reforming the social insurance system, such as by expanding or contracting it by
20%, would have only a negligible impact on wealth distribution.
This version of the paper, to provide a ﬁrst investigation, uses a dynastic framework
that abstracts from life-cycle features, ignores the social security (public pension) sys-
tem, and highly simpliﬁes the health insurance system. As these institutional factors
have important implications for saving behaviors, they should be accounted for to al-
low for a more precise investigation as an extension. As such, the simpliﬁed calibration
described in section 3 must be improved in a manner corresponding to the extended
model.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model
before section 3 describes the calibration of the model. After section 4 presents the
results of the benchmark simulation and the policy experiments, section 5 presents the
conclusions drawn from the study ﬁndings.
3Mukoyama and Sahin (2006) and Krusell et al. (2009) also attribute the nature of wealth distribution
in the United States to these factors.
4Fuster, Imrohoroglu and Imrohoroglu (2007) adopted a similar strategy to study the effects of eliminat-
ing the Social Security system (the U.S. public pension system) on welfare.
22 Model Environment
The model economy is populated by a large number households (measure one). that are
ex-anteidentical except regardingskill level(denoted byl), which is given exogenously
and determines the persistent level of household income.
2.1 Shocks
Income Shocks
All households face the prospect of idiosyncratic labor endowment shocks (l) that create
income ﬂuctuations. The shocks l are assumed to be discrete and evolve according to
a ﬁrst-order Markov process within a transition probability matrix pl A household’s
effective labor supply is ll and labor income wll, where w is the wage rate.
Medical Expenditure Shocks
All households also face the prospect of idiosyncratic medical expenditure shocks (x)
that also evolve independently according to a ﬁrst-order Markov process within a tran-
sition probability matrix px. The medical expenditures here represent out-of-pocket
expenditures that are assumed to be expended only for recovery without generating util-
ity.
Preference Shocks
Following Krusell and Smith (1998), this model assumes that a household’s time pref-
erence may change. The utility discount factor b, which assumes one of three values
fbh;bm;blg, is also stochastic. Within this framework, households with higher b tend to
save more, which contributes to the generation of the right tail of the wealth distribution.
b is also assumed to follow a Markov process.
The three stochastic processes are assumed to be distributed identically and inde-
pendently across households and over time.
2.2 Asset Market
As the asset market is incomplete, households are constrained by a limited level of
liquidity. Because households can only borrow a limited amount, b, they cannot fully
ensure that they can reach their minimum level of consumption by engaging in asset
trading. Therefore, households will save in a precautionary manner to guard against
uncertainty.
32.3 Firm
Assume that a representative ﬁrm hires labor and rents capital from households, and
only effective labor (lili;t for each household i) is productive. Let Yt denote the total
output at periodt, and Kt the aggregate capital, and Nt the aggregate effective labor. The




2.4 Social Insurance and Government
Assume the existence of an asset-based, means-tested social insurance system that guar-
anteesaminimumlevelofconsumptionCbysupplementingincomewhenahousehold’s
disposable wealth (H) falls below C, in accordance with Hubbard et al. (1995).
The government taxes household labor income to ﬁnance the social insurance sys-
tem. Because the labor supply is inelastic, this taxation policy does not affect labor
supply and will only slightly distort household saving decisions.5 The government is
required to have a balanced budget at each period.
2.5 Household’s Problem
In the economy, household i chooses a level of consumption l (ci;t) and asset holdings














ci;t +ai;t+1 = (1¡tt)wtlili;t +(1+rt)ai;t ¡xi;t +TRi;t; (3)
TRi;t = maxf0; C¡Hi;tg; (4)
ai;t ¸ ¡b; ci;t > 0; (5)
where Hi;t = (1¡tt)wi;tli;t +(1+r)ai;t ¡xi;t.
5If the government taxes capital income, it will directly distort asset prices and affect asset-holding and
consumption decisions. By assuming that the government taxes household labor, this study can more easily
focus on the impact of a social insurance system on savings behavior and wealth distribution.
4In the above household’s problem, Et is the expectation operator. Given a wage
rate wt and a rate of return of assets rt, the household receives after-tax (tax rate tt)
labor income (1¡tt)wtlili;t and previous assets plus interest (1+rt)ai;t at period t. The
household may also receive a transfer TRi;t if qualiﬁed for the social insurance program
(i.e. C¡Hi;t > 0).
3 Parameterization and Model Computation
The model period is set at one year. In the production function, the capital share (q)
is set at 0.36 and the depreciation rate of capital (d) at 0.06 (from Stokey and Rebelo,
1995). The liquidity constraint b is set at zero.
Preference Shocks
In accordance with Krusell and Smith (1998), the discount factor process is calibrated
byassumingasymmetricdistributionofb, with80%ofthepopulationfallingwithinthe
middle value and 10% falling at each extreme point within any time period. As the ex-
treme discount values are expected to persist for 120 years, they are more persistent than
Krusell and Smith (1998) had assumed. The three values of b with a slight deviation
(less than 1%) from its mean, f.968 .955 .952g, are selected so that the wealth distribu-
tion can match some features of the data.6 Table 2 in the following section displays the
features of the wealth distribution.
Skill Levels and Income Shocks
This model assumed the existence of four skill levels (l) that had led to the emergence
of four permanent income groups. The target of the calibration is to match the average
income of the top 25% of households to the average income of households in the bottom
25%. Four values of labor efﬁciency l, f2.2, 1.0, 0.55, 0.25g, are used such that the
model can match the average household income data from 1990 to 1995 (U.S. Census
Bureau). The mean of l is normalized to unity.
Within each permanent income group, individuals face income ﬂuctuations, which
are captured by the labor endowment shocks in the model. A ﬁrst order autoregressive
(AR(1)) process is used to approximate the pattern of the logarithm of labor endowment
6The calibration result slightly differs from that of Krusell and Smith (1998). Whereas they had relied
solely on the discount factor process to match the wealth distribution, this study assumes that the social
insurance system also plays a role in wealth distribution.
5shocks, lt.7 The process is set as:
log(lt+1) = rllog(lt)+elt; (6)
where elt is white noise. Based on Hubbard et al. (1995)’s estimation of the middle-
educationgroup, therl issetat0.955andthevarianceofelt at0.025. TheAR(1)process
is approximated using a three-state Markov chain.8
Medical expenditure shocks
To characterize medical expenditure risk, a four-state Markov chain is employed. Out-
of-pocket medical expenditures are calculated by assuming that out-of-pocket costs rep-
resent 20% of total medical costs for each medical state (from Medical Expenditure
Panel Survey (MEPS)), a percentage roughly equal to that of the U.S. population under
65 in 1996 and 1997. Table 1 describes the deﬁnitions of the four states. The transition
probabilities are calculated using data obtained from Monheit (2003), who studied the
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The Social Insurance System
Consistent with Hubbard et al.’s (1995) estimation, the means-tested consumption ﬂoor
C is set at 20% of average labor income such that the benchmark model can represent
the size of the U.S. social insurance system.
Computation Methodology
The methodology used to approximate the steady state equilibrium is similar to that used
by Aiyagari(1994), including value function iteration with linear interpolation of the
asset states and the bisection method with adjusting upper/lower bounds for equilibrium
price convergency.
7Aiyagari (1994) and Hubbard et al. (1995) employed a similar framework.
8See the procedure described in Tauchen (1986).
64 Quantitative Analysis
The model economy with C is set at 20% of average labor income as a benchmark. By
doing so, the simulation results obtained using the benchmark model reﬂect a wealth
distribution much closer to that of the U.S. distribution, as compared with basic Bewley
models (Table 2).
4.1 Policy Experiments
Elimination of the Social Insurance System
If the social insurance system is entirely eliminated, all households and particularly
lower-income households, can no longer rely on the distribution of social insurance
beneﬁts to secure their consumption, and must thus engage in precautionary savings
behaviors to guard against uncertainty. Eliminating the social insurance system within
a society that offers no other form of public or private assistance would lead households
at the bottom of the income distribution to increase their asset holdings, and would thus
decrease the Gini coefﬁcient to .56. Table 3 presents the experimental results.
Social Insurance Reform
In contrast to the signiﬁcant impact of eliminating the social security system, engaging
in minor reform of the social insurance system would not have a signiﬁcant impact on
wealth distribution. When a 20% expansion (i.e., increasing C to 24% of average labor
income) such that the social insurance system covers more households as well as a 20%
contraction (i.e., decreasing C to 16% of average labor income) such that it covers fewer
households were investigated, both reforms were found to have a negligible impact on
wealth distribution. See the comparison in Table 4.
4.2 Robustness Tests
ThediscountfactorprocessisconstructedfollowingseveralassumptionsmadeinKrusell
and Smith (1998). To test the robustness of the results, the same experiments were per-
formed by ﬁxing b at 0.96 for all agents, and thus eliminating the heterogeneity over
b. Table 5 presents the results. Although the nature of the wealth distribution presented
in the table, particular within the right tail, does not match the data, it reﬂects a very
similar impact of the social insurance system on wealth distribution. Speciﬁcally, it in-
dicates that entirely eliminating the social insurance system signiﬁcantly decreases the
7Gini coefﬁcient whereas reforming the system, whether by expanding or contracting it,
has no signiﬁcant impact.
5 Concluding Remarks
Thispaperinvestigatedtheimpactoftheexistenceofanasset-based, means-testedsocial
insurance system on wealth distribution. Previous studies have found that the existence
of such a system in the United States is largely responsible for the low rate of savings
and the lack of asset holdings among many Americans. This paper extended these stud-
ies by examining the extent to which the existence of a social insurance system can
explain the nature of wealth distribution in the United States and determining whether
reform of the system would affect wealth distribution. To conduct this investigation, a
dynamic equilibrium (Bewley-type) model with heterogeneous agents was developed to
characterize the current nature of wealth distribution in the United States. The results
obtained by examining skill levels, uninsurable risks, time preferences, and the social
insurance system (safety net), the primary factors in the wealth distribution (inequality)
reﬂected in the model, and by performing counterfactual and policy experiments suggest
that entirely eliminating the social insurance system would prompt households charac-
terized by low levels of income and assets to increase their precautionary savings and
would decrease the Gini coefﬁcient from nearly .80 to less than .60. In contrast, the re-
sults indicate that merely reforming the social insurance system, whether by expanding
or contracting it by 20%, would have no signiﬁcant impact on wealth distribution.
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9Table 1: States of Medical Expenditure
State Low Fair High Very High
Expenditure Range Bottom 70% 70 – 95% 95 – 99% top 1%
Out-of-Pocket Expenditure
as of Average Income 0.20% 2.53% 13.18% 59.66%
Source: MEPS, 1996.
Table 2: Social Insurance and Wealth Inequality
Percentage of Wealth Held by
Gini Top Top Top Bottom
Index 1% 5% 20% 40%
U.S Data1 .78 29.6 53.6 79.5 1.4
Baseline Aiyagari1 .38 3.2 13.1 41.0 14.9
Benchmark Model .80 22.4 52.0 83.6 0.1
Note: From Quadrini and Rios-Rull (1997).
Table 3: Impact of Social Insurance on Wealth Distribution
Percentage of Wealth Held by
Gini Top Top Top Bottom
Index 1% 5% 20% 40%
Benchmark Model (C = 20% ¯ w) .80 22.4 52.0 83.6 0.1
No Social Insurance
Some Private Assistance (C = 5% ¯ w) .75 20.5 47.7 77.5 2.3
Little Private Assistance (C = 1% ¯ w) .70 19.0 44.5 73.4 4.2
No Private Assistance .56 14.2 33.8 59.2 9.1
Notes: ¯ wrepresentsthemeanwage; thevaluesofCineconomieswithoutasocialinsurancesystem
represent levels of private or charity assistance.
Table 4: Impact of Social Insurance Reform
Percentage of Wealth Held by
Gini Top Top Top Bottom
Index 1% 5% 20% 40%
Benchmark Model .80 22.4 52.0 83.6 0.1
20% Expansion .81 22.5 52.3 83.8 0.09
20% Contraction .79 22.0 51.2 82.5 0.7
Notes: a 20% expansion represents a 20% increase in the consumption ﬂoor;
C = 0:24 ¯ w; a 20% contraction represents C = 0:16 ¯ w.
10Table 5: Robustness Tests: Economies without b Heterogeneity
Percentage of Wealth Held by
Gini Top Top Top Bottom
Index 1% 5% 20% 40%
With Social Insurance1 .616 6.9 26.0 62.7 3.8
With a 20% Expansion .623 7.0 26.3 63.4 3.6
With a 20% Reduction .607 6.8 25.7 61.8 4.0
With no Social Insurance .383 4.6 17.1 42.8 14.7
Note: C = 0:20 ¯ w , as in the benchmark model.
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